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and 
(c) The patient lacks the ability to 
engage in a rational decision-making process 
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weigh the possible costs and benefits of 
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charge, the court shall hold a hearing within 
a reasonable time to determine the claim of 
mental illness of the defendant. Mental 
illness, for this purpose, is determined by 
the definition stated in Subsection 76-2-
305(4). The court may order the defendant to 
be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or 
any other suitable facility, and may receive 
the evidence of any private or public expert 
witness whose evidence is offered by the 
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be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise 
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other offender. If the court concludes that 
the defendant is currently mentally ill, 
applying the standards set forth in this 
section, the defendant's plea shall be 
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mentally ill offender. Expenses of 
examination, observation, or treatment, 
excluding travel to and from any mental 
health facility, shall be charged to the 
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county, except when the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay part of all of 
the expense where the Legislature has 
expressly appropriated money for this 
purpose. Travel expenses shall be charged to 
the county in which prosecution is 
commenced. Examination of defendants charged 
with municipal or county ordinance violations 
shall be charged to the municipality or 
county commencing the prosecution. 
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(3) If the defendant is found guilty and 
mentally ill, the court shall impose any 
sentence which could be imposed under law 
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same 
offense. Before sentencing, the court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine the 
defendant's present mental status. 
(4) The court shall in its sentence 
order hospitalization at the Utah State 
Hospital or other suitable facility if, upon 
completion of the hearing and consideration 
of the record, the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
(a) the defendant has a mental 
illness as defined by Subsection 
76-2-305(4); 
(b) because of his mental 
illness the defendant poses an 
immediate physical danger to others 
or self, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others' 
safety, health, or welfare if 
placed in a correctional or 
probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation; 
(c) the defendant lacks the 
ability to engage in a rational 
decision-making process regarding 
the acceptance of mental treatment 
as demonstrated by evidence of 
inability to weigh the possible 
costs and benefits of treatment; 
(d) there is no appropriate 
treatment alternative to a court 
order of hospitalization; and 
(e) the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility can provide 
the defendant with treatment, care, 
and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's 
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conditions and needs. 
(8) When the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility proposes to discharge 
a defendant prior to the expiration of 
sentence, the institution shall transmit to 
the Board of Pardons a report on the 
condition of the defendant, including the 
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course of 
treatment, the prognosis for the remission of 
symptoms, the potential for recidivism and 
for the danger to himself and the public, and 
the recommendations for future treatment. 
The Board of Pardons shall direct that the 
defendant serve any or all of the unexpired 
term of the sentence at the Utah State 
Prison, or place the defendant on parole. If 
the Board of Pardon's pursuant to law or 
administrative rules, considers for parole 
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty 
and mentally ill, the board shall consult 
with the treating facility or agency and an 
additional report on the condition of the 
defendant may be filed with the board. 
Pending action of the board, the defendant 
shall remain at the institution at which he 
is hospitalized. If the defendant is placed 
on parole, treatment shall, upon the 
recommendation of the hospital facility, be 
made a condition of parole, and failure to 
continue treatment or other condition of 
parole except by agreement with the 
designated facility and the Board of Pardons 
is a basis for initiating parole violation 
hearings. The period of parole may not be 
for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced 
without consideration by the Board of Pardons 
of a current report on the mental health 
status of the offender. 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880257 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant relies on his opening brief, and refers this 
Court to that brief for the statements of jurisdiction, issues, 
the case, and the facts, and the summary of the argument. 
Appellant responds to the State's answer to the opening brief as 
follows: 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
SUBSECTION (b) OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
SECTION 77-35-21.5(4), AND SHOULD 
CONCLUDE THAT THE APPLICATION OF THAT 
SUBSECTION IN THIS CASE VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD REACH THE MERITS. 
The State notes that Appellant did not raise the 
constitutionality of subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-
1 
35-21.5 in the lower court, and asks this Court to decide this 
(b) because of his mental illness the 
defendant poses an immediate physical danger 
to others or self, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others' safety, 
health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or lacks 
the ability to provide the basic necessities 
of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, 
1 
issue raised on appeal on waiver grounds, without reaching the 
2 
merits. While Appellant recognizes that valid interests 
3 
protected by the contemporaneous objection rule, Appellant 
requests that this Court address the constitutionality of 
subsection (b) of Utah Code Ann. section 77-35-21.5, 
notwithstanding the fact that the issue was not addressed in the 
lower court. 
The possibility of improper sentencing and treatment of 
the mentally ill offenders in Utah, resulting from an unworkable 
statute governing the sentencing and treatment of those people, 
is reason enough to permit an exception to the contemporaneous 
4 
objection rule in this case. Further, the inconsistencies in 
the trial court's findings and between some of the findings and 
the court's recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Paroles 
demonstrate that the court should have recognized that 
subsection (b) cannot be applied iii this case in a rational 
if placed on probation; 
2 Respondent's brief, 13-14. 
3 Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(d) provides: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses 
or objections or to make requests which must be made 
prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause 
shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
4 See State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 287-290 
(1988)(separate opinions of Justice Stewart, Durham, and 
Zimmerman, recognizing the exceptional problems caused by 
ignoring the need for adequate legislation concerning the 
treatment of mentally ill and mentally retarded people in the 
criminal justice system). 
2 
manner. The result of the court's failure to strike that factor 
from its consideration is that Appellant was sentenced to prison 
instead of to the Utah State Hospital, where he is statutorily 
entitled to treatment for his mental illnesses. Accordingly, 
this Court should address the constitutionality of subsection 
(b), because the trial court's failure to do so constituted plain 
error. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35-36 (Utah 
1989)(discussing the plain error doctrine). Alternatively, this 
Court should address the constitutionality of subsection (b) to 
guide the courts in the application of section 77-35-21.5. 
B. THE APPLICATION OF SUBSECTION (b) IN THIS CASE VIOLATED DUE 
PROCESS. 
The State argues that the standard of evaluation of the 
constitutionality of subsection (b) should be one of "fairness", 
characterizing the issue raised here as one of procedural due 
6 
process. Appellant is not arguing that there has been a lack of 
procedure in this case. Rather, his argument is that the 
substance of subsection (b) is irrational. Hence, the 
substantive due process analysis and arbitrary and capricious 
test utilized by this Court in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 
(Utah 1988) are proper tools in this case. 
Seeking to uphold the constitutionality of subsection 
5 See State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-1272 (Utah 
1988), and the appellate briefs in that case (number 860491), 
which demonstrate that this Court may choose to address sua 
sponte the constitutionality of the statute governing the 
treatment of the mentally ill. 
6 Respondent's brief at 14. 
3 
(b)# the State characterizes the proof of dangerousness 
requirement as a procedural benefit to the defendant, because it 
requires the sentencing court to tailor the defendant's sentence 
7 
to him according to his individual circumstances. While 
individualized sentencing is a laudable goal, the goal is not met 
in the context of treatment of mentally ill offenders through the 
application of the dangerousness prerequisite to treatment, 
which, if proved, might be construed as calling for 
8 
imprisonment. 
In State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), this 
Court recognized the two goals of section 77-35-21.5: 
"defendant's right to treatment and society's right to protection 
against a potentially dangerous individual". _Id. at 1271. The 
language of subsection (b), which requires a showing of 
dangerousness of the defendant to himself or others as a 
prerequisite to treatment for mental illness, seeks to limit the 
class of defendants eligible for treatment, thus working against 
the "defendant's right to treatment" interest asserted by the 
statute. Requiring a showing of dangerousness as a prerequisite 
to treatment also disserves the second interest asserted by the 
statute, "society's right to protection against a dangerous 
individual". While requiring a showing of dangerousness prior to 
7 Respondent's brief at 15-17. 
8 See Respondent's brief at 30, noting that "[T]he 
evidence clearly establishes that the Utah State Hospital could 
not provide him with needed treatment, and defendant posed a 
security risk if sentenced to that institution." 
4 
hospitalization furthers the state interest of preser \ ing a 
person's liberty in the civil commitment context, In the context 
of i; reaf-J n< f mental hv i | | criminal defendants, where there is no 
liberty interest to be protected, requiring a showing of 
dangerousness defeats the interests of the statute. 
Pai: t i ci :iJ ai: J ;; i f t: 1 I:! s Coi :ii: t: :::ondones the trial court's 
actions in considering the dangers posed by Appellant in 
assessing the ability of the State Hospital to treat Appellant, 
l.ln I uiiLjiiacjC in t.ijbseci j on (l>) inquiring a showing of 
dangerousness as a prerequisite to treatment is nonsensical in 
this case. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING 
APPELLANT TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
A<> T h e t r^ a i court's misinterpretation of section 76-2-305(4) was 
not harmless error. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-305 defines mental illness: 
• • • • 
VT:/ "Mental illness" means a mental 
disease or defect. A mental defect may be a 
congenital condition or one the result of 
injury or a residual effect of a physical or 
mental disease. Mental illness does not 
mean a personality or character disorder or 
abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal conduct. 
The State concedes that the phrase "manifested only by repeated 
9 See pages 3 and 4 of the court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law; State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Utah 
1988)("If neither the hospital nor any other facility can 
provide 'treatment, care and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and needs,' placement 
in such a facility may not be justified because of the additional 
security burdens it would impose."), 
5 
criminal conduct" modifies personality and character disorders, 
as well as abnormalities.10 However, the language of the trial 
court's findings of facts and conclusions of law support 
Appellant's assertion, which is not contested by the State, that 
the trial court interpreted that section as excluding all 
personality disorders from the definition of mental illness. 
Paragraph 3 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reads 
as follows: 
The Court finds that the defendant has 
several personality disorders and tends to 
abuse drugs and alcohol, conditions which do 
not constitute mental illness as defined by 
Section 76-2-305(4). 
The State argues that even if the court misinterpreted 
76-2-305(4), the error was harmless because the court found 
Appellant mentally ill by virtue of his mental retardation and 
admitted evidence concerning all of Appellant's mental 
illnesses.11 Had the court recognized Appellant's personality 
disorders as illnesses eligible for treatment, however, the 
court's finding under subsection (e) of section 77-35-21.5, which 
requires the court to determine if the Hospital can treat the 
mental illnesses, would have supported sentencing Appellant to 
the Hospital. While the doctors from the State Hospital 
disagreed with the court's finding that Appellant suffers from 
the personality disorders (T. 83, 84, 104, 129), they testified 
that the State Hospital is equipped to treat such disorders (T. 
10 Respondent's brief at 22. 
11 Respondent's Brief at 22-24. 
6 
87, 94, 133-134). 
Thus, unless this Court upholds the constitutionality 
of subseet 11 HI (li)f uint i • - m n s analysis of that 
subsection and subsection trial court's misunderstanding 
of the definition of mental illness could not have been harmless 
error. 
B. Appellant carried his burden under subsection of section 
77-35-21.5. 
The State indicates that Appellant failt- meet his 
burden under subsection it • , because he did not prove that the 
dar. ; •.•.:•:• . mental illness, as opposed to 
his drug and alcohol abuse. *" Appellant's behavior problems, 
however, are causally related to his mental illnesses. 
Appellant's int-alal i H ,i r < l<if i mi I'aust'h h i rii difficulty in judging 
social reality, resulting ii i 1 i:i s engaging i n "very poor social 
judgments" (T. 31-32). The anoxia incurred when Appellant was 
eighteen resulted 11 i orga i: i i c br a i n s> ndrome and the exaggeration 
of his behavioral problems, and leads Appellant to "strike out" 
and deal impulsively with his frustrations (R. 34, 55-57). 
Appe 1 lant' s menta 1 retardati o n ,„ orgai I i c brain 
personality disorders result in his inability others, 
his need to obey others without thinking, his «v >ei:' esteem, 
and his taking dr ugs I o a ] t er 1 low 1: ie £e< *] s (T. '•'""- ) . 
While there was evidence that alcohol and drugs are 
causally related to Appellant's dangerousness, there was also 
12 Respondent's brief at 25. 
7 
evidence that his dangerousness is a result of his mental 
illnesses. 
The State indicates that there was insufficient proof 
that Appellant is in danger in the prison as a result of his 
mental illnesses, claiming that his inability to assert himself, 
his inability to resist being led, and his being abused by others 
(see defense exhibit 2) do not constitute a dangers worthy of 
protection. The language of subsection (b) is broad enough to 
encompass these dangers. It reads: 
(b) because of his mental 
illness the defendant poses an 
immediate physical danger to others 
or self, which may include 
jeopardizing his own or others ' 
safety, health, or welfare if 
placed in a correctional or 
probation setting, or lacks the 
ability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what dangers must be 
posed to a mentally ill person in the prison in order to qualify 
him for the protections afforded by section 77-35-21.5(b) if the 
dangers posed to Appellant as a result of his mental illnesses 
are insufficient. 
C. This Court should clarify the definition of "treatment" under 
subsection (e). 
After lengthy and careful analysis, the State 
determines that the legislature intended that mentally retarded 
13 Respondent's brief at 26. 
8 
offenders qualify as "mentally i11" under section 77-35-21.5. 
Appellant asks this Court to interpret subsection (e) of section 
77-35-2 J 5j :: ' I i I a m a i i < *:i : i 1: Ia 1: !:<: ici 3 itates t he J egis3 ative desire 
to provide special treatment for mentally retarded offenders. 
See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed. 1987, section 
46. 05f "Whole Statute" Interpretatioi I ("!,:P. si a 1 ,i i1e :i s passed as a 
whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general 
purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be 
c o n s 1: i: i :i e d I n c o n n e c t i o i i w i 11 i e \ e r y o t h e i: p a i: t o r s e c t i o n s o a s t o 
produce a harmonious whole."). 
The State correctly distinguishes Matter of Giles, 657 
P.2d 285 (Utalt Colyar v. Third Judicial District Court, 
469 F.Supp. 424 1979) as cases dealing with civil 
commitment. Inasmuch as "treatment" I n the civi 1 commitment 
context must be sufficiently appropr i «J t. v lu Hie patient ";. needs 
to justify intruding on that person's liberty and privacy, 
14 Respondent's Brief at 18-21. 
While the terminology used by the legislature in this 
statute may be "clinically offensive" in classifying mentally 
retarded people as mentally ill, Appellant would note that there 
is nothing offensive about the intended result of that 
classification - the special treatment of mentally retarded 
people. See State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 287-290 
(1988)(separate opinions of Justice Stewart, Durham, and 
Zimmerman, recognizing the legitimacy of special treatment of 
mentally ill and mentally retarded people in the criminal justice 
system). 
15 (e) the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility can provide 
the defendant with treatment, care, 
and custody that is adequate and 
appropriate to the defendant's 
conditions and needs. 
9 
perhaps in the context of treating mentally ill offenders who 
have no liberty interest at stake, the definition of "treatment" 
should be broader than it is in the civil commitment context. 
Cf. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1272. 
In support of Appellant's assertion that the dangers 
posed by him should not be factored into the consideration of the 
propriety of treatment at the State Hospital under subsection 
(e), Appellant refers this Court to Senate Bill No. 59 (1989 
general session), wherein the legislature created a Psychiatric 
Security Review Board to oversee the treatment of mentally ill 
offenders, and wherein treatment is repeatedly made contingent on 
the danger posed by or to the mentally ill offender. In the 
event that this Court agrees with Appellant that the Utah 
Legislature does not consider dangerousness to be a reason to 
prevent a person from being in the State Hospital,16 this Court 
may choose to reinterpret the competing interests involved in 
this context as the defendant's need for treatment and society's 
unwillingness to pay for it.17 
16 See also Utah Code Ann. sections 64-7-36 (civil 
commitment of dangerous people), 62A-12-204(2) and (3)(requiring 
State Hospital to accept "any" persons from other institutions 
and from the prison after evaluation of the treatment needs of 
those persons and the availability of treatment programs). 
17 See Murphy v. State, 760 P.2d 280 (Utah 1988): 
Finally, it is unfortunate, as Justice 
Durham suggests, that the state has largely 
ignored the problems presented by the fact 
that a significant number of people entering 
the criminal justice system suffer from 
mental illness or retardation. While 
mandatory incarceration and ever-longer 
sentences are politically popular, spending 
10 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant asks that this Court clarify Utah Code Ann. 
section 7 7- 3 5 - 23 • 5 and remai id I :i :! s case fc r resentencing in 
accordance with that statute and due process. 
Respectfully submitted this 
1989. 
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Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that IQ copies 
of the foregoing were delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, and 
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to the Attorney General's Office, 236, State Capitol, Salt pp^e 
City, Utah, 84114, this J^ day of \ '[J^Y^ ^ 1989 T 
money to adequately house those confined, 
much less treat those suffering from mental 
problems, is not." 
Id * at 290, Justice Zimmerman's concurring opinion. 
Alternately, this Court may choose to recognize that 
"society's right to protection from a potentially dangerous 
individual" succeeds when dangerous mentally ill offenders are 
given treatment, rather than a term in prison where treatment may 
not occur prior to release. 
In these circumstances, the dangerousness criteria in 
subsection (b) are rational because they would insure that the 
most dangerous offenders are treated prior to their release into 
society, and would limit the number of offenders eligible for 
state financed treatment. 
x l 
